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Abstract
Objectives Do people living in more corrupted countries report worse health? We answer this question by investigating the
relationship between country-level corruption and the number of chronic diseases for a sample of Europeans aged above
50.
Methods We link a rich panel dataset on individual health and socio-demographic characteristics with two country-level
corruption indices, analyse the overall relationship with pooled ordinary least squares and fixed-effect models, explore
heterogeneous effects driven by country and individual factors, and disentangle the effect across different public sectors.
Results Individuals living in more corrupted countries suffer from a higher number of chronic diseases. The heterogeneity
analysis shows that (1) health outcomes are worsened especially for respondents living in relatively low-income countries;
(2) the health of females and people with poor socio-economic status is more affected by corruption; (3) the corruption–
health negative link mainly occurs for cardiovascular diseases and ulcers; (4) only corrupted sectors linked with healthcare
are associated with poorer health.
Conclusions We inform the policy debate with novel results in establishing a nexus between corruption and morbidity
indicators.
Keywords Corruption  Public health  Chronic diseases  Europe
Introduction
An efficient provision of healthcare services is crucial to
individual and social well-being in both developing and
developed countries. In developed countries, for instance,
healthcare represents one of the largest government
expenditures [6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in
countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), Joumard et al.
(2010)]. At the same time, several elements have been
identified, suggesting that this sector is particularly prone
to corruption (European Commission 2013; Petkov and
Cohen 2016; Hussmann 2011).
A longstanding and most popular definition understands
corruption as ‘‘the abuse of power by a public official for
private gain’’ (Miller 2018). As such, it is not clear a priori
whether corruption threatens the health of citizens—for
instance, through a reduction in the quality, the accessi-
bility, or the trust of healthcare—or may serve as a channel
for the informal economy to increase the quantity of
healthcare. In general, while the effects of corruption on
economic and social outcomes have long been debated,
scholars have not reached yet an uncontroversial conclu-
sion, as the sign of the effect crucially depends on the
questions addressed.
A large body of literature acknowledges the detrimental
role of corruption on several socio-economic indicators,
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such as economic growth (Mo 2001; Ehrlich and Lui 1999,
among others), income inequality (Gupta et al. 2002),
investments (Campos et al. 1999), productivity (Lambs-
dorff 2003), social trust (Li and Wu 2010; Richey 2010),
and trust in institutions (Torcal and Christmann 2018).
Empirically, various authors (Mauro 1998; Gupta et al.
2002) show that higher level of corruption is associated, in
general, with an alteration of the government spending
composition and, in particular, to a reduction in the ratio of
healthcare and education spending to GDP. On the link
between corruption and health outcomes, most papers find
negative relations employing aggregate health outcomes,
such as mortality rates and life expectancy at birth (Gupta
et al. 2000; Muldoon et al. 2011; Nadpara and Samanta
2015). Interestingly, many of these findings document a
stronger effect in developing countries, where corruption
tends to be endemic, and widespread income inequalities
are more likely to imply the exclusion of a considerable
portion of the population from the healthcare system.
Another channel of the detrimental effect of corruption on
health is the effectiveness of public health expenditure
(Rajkumar and Swaroop 2007; Factor and Kang 2015,
among others).
On the contrary, few but still non-negligible papers
claim that a certain degree of ‘efficient corruption’ may
lead to higher economic growth (Leff 1964; Huntington
2006), especially in countries characterised by weak or
inefficient institutions (Méon and Weill 2010). In particu-
lar, bribery actions may help firms in overcoming
bureaucracy-related stalls and consequently speed-up pro-
ductivity. This view claims that ‘‘if the government erred in
its decision, the course made possible by corruption may
well be the better one’’ (Leff 1964); corruption would thus
act as a ‘greasing’ mechanism capable of speeding up the
inefficient wheels of bureaucracy.
Our research also speaks to the health economics liter-
ature that deals with health outcomes. This literature
mostly relies on aggregate mortality indicators, such as life
expectancy at birth, infant and mother mortality rates, and
children immunisation rate (Gupta et al. 2002; Muldoon
et al. 2011; Dincer and Teoman 2019). However, morbidity
indicators would be preferable as they account for health
gains due to specific treatments (Joumard et al. 2010;
Anderson and Horvath 2004). In addition, the use of
individual-level data would provide more insights as it
allows capturing heterogeneous effects depending on
socio-demographic characteristics. In this respect, Bollyky
et al. (2019) have recently shown the negative link between
democracy and cause-specific mortality.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between cor-
ruption and individual morbidity indicators. To this pur-
pose, we match data on country-level corruption, as
measured by the Corruption Perception Index (hereinafter,
CPI), with longitudinal data on individual health outcomes
for a panel of European citizens aged 50?. In our esti-
mations, we employ both pooled ordinary least squares
(OLS) and fixed-effects empirical methodologies.
The contribution of our paper to the existing literature is
threefold. First, there are no studies that investigate the link
between corruption and health outcomes in high-income
countries. The literature has mainly focussed on aggregate
outcomes in developing countries, and we have surpris-
ingly not found any papers assessing the link between
corruption and morbidity outcomes in the European Union.
Second, we rely on morbidity rather than mortality indi-
cators as our dependent variable. This represents an inno-
vation since the literature has traditionally focussed on
indicators such as life expectancy at birth and child mor-
tality. We believe that our morbidity indicator (i.e. the
number of chronic diseases) represents a much better proxy
for the healthcare quality in high-income countries, where
mortality indicators tend to be similar and chronic diseases
are becoming more widespread (Seo et al. 2017; Becchetti
et al. 2017). Third, differently from most of the existing
literature, our dataset makes it possible to observe the
variability of selected morbidity indicators at individual
level. This allows us to explore the heterogeneous effect of
corruption across socio-demographic characteristics.
Analogously, data on the occurrence of specific chronic
diseases allow us to investigate the heterogeneous rela-
tionship between corruption and the probability of being
affected by each disease.
Transmission channels of corruption
in healthcare
The existing literature identifies six different types of
healthcare corruption potentially arising from five kinds of
interactions between service providers, payers, customers
of healthcare services, and the medical industry (European
Commission 2013; Bruckner 2019). Bribery typically
enters the relation between providers and patients and
consists in the payment of a bribe in exchange for the
access to the service. This practice seems to be particularly
widespread in countries where healthcare services are
financed through general taxation and providers’ salaries
are relatively low. Informal payments have been generally
associated with healthcare systems in former socialist
countries, but some evidence suggests that they are also
widespread in some Mediterranean countries like Greece
and Italy. Corruption in the procurement of pharmaceuti-
cals and medical devices, together with improper market-
ing relations, characterises the relation between the
medical industry and providers. This includes, for instance,
the alteration of the lawful bidding process and the reten-
tion of providers through small gifts. Improper marketing
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relations can also arise between the industry and the reg-
ulator, when the medical industry may employ its lobbying
power to influence policies. The misuse of high-level
positions involves all actors but patients and is charac-
terised by high-level relations among industry, regulators,
politicians, and providers, benefiting the medical industry.
Practices in this group include regulatory capture and
conflict of interest or reimburses for services which are not
carried out or do not necessary characterise the relation
between providers and payers. These practices, which
potentially lead to an increase in insurance premia and,
consequently, to the exclusion of the poorest from basic
healthcare, is particularly widespread in countries where
healthcare is financed through public or private insurance
coverage. In Europe, this happens especially in Central
Europe countries such as Germany, France, and The
Netherlands. The last type of corruption involves providers
only and concerns the embezzlement of drugs and medical
devices illegally sold or used for private gain.
Methods
Data
We combine two sources of data, namely the Survey of
Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and
CPI. SHARE is a longitudinal dataset that contains infor-
mation on health and socio-economic status of a sample of
Europeans aged above 50 (Börsch-Supan et al. 2013). We
focus on waves 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, covering the period
2004–2015 (we exclude wave 3 as it refers to a retro-
spective survey of people life’s history). We consider the
following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. CPI is a
worldwide-known index provided by Transparency Inter-
national, a non-governmental non-profit organisation
whose purpose is to fight corruption through the proposal
of anti-corruption measures. This index ranks 176 countries
from the most to the least corrupted on a 0–10 scale and is
calculated annually on the basis of a methodology
involving surveys and assessments from leading institu-
tions on corruption like the World Bank, the World Eco-
nomic Forum, and the African Development Bank. The
index has been widely used in the literature and its validity
has been tested in comparison with many different indi-
cators (Wilhelm 2002). In particular, CPI is highly corre-
lated with two other proxies of corruption, i.e. black market
activity and over-abundance of regulation. As a robustness
check, we also employ the Control of Corruption index
(hereinafter, CoC), provided annually by the World Bank,
and different sector-specific corruption perception
measures (hereinafter, CPs for each sector s as described
below) provided biennially by Eurobarometer, as alterna-
tive proxies for corruption. CoC ranges from - 2.5 to 2.5
and, similarly to CPI, ranks countries from the least to the
most corrupted based on perceived levels of petty and
grand corruption (for a comparison between the two indi-
ces see Rohwer 2009). CPs measures national perception of
corruption in the following sectors s: public healthcare,
police, judicial courts, national politicians, public tenders,
and the concession of building and business permits
(see the Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM)-B for
details on Eurobarometer).
The merge of these two independent datasets on indi-
vidual health outcomes and expert assessment of national
corruption ensures that our estimates do not suffer from
any bias resulting from the same person answering possibly
related questions.
Econometric analysis
To investigate the effect of corruption on our variable of
interest, we assume that the health outcome for individual i
in wave t is related to CPI in country c and wave t
according to the following econometric specification:
Healthi;t ¼ b0 þ b1CPIci;t þ b2Xi;t þ b3Zi;t þ Regioni
þWavet þ ei;t; ð1Þ
where Healthi;t represents the number of chronic diseases
that respondent i declared as diagnosed by a doctor during
wave t and CPIci;t is our proxy for the level of corruption in
country ci where respondent i resided in wave t. Alterna-
tively, we replace Healthi;t with the probability of respon-
dent i to be affected by at least one chronic disease. We are
interested in estimating the coefficient b1, which captures
the effect of CPIci;t on Healthi;t.
We further include a wide set of covariates to account
for individual characteristics that are likely to be correlated
with health outcomes. More specifically, Xi;t is a vector of
socio-demographic characteristics of individual i during
wave t and includes gender, age, education in years, log-
arithm of household income, current job status (retired,
employed, unemployed, permanently disabled, and home-
maker), marital status (married, not married, divorced, and
widowed), place of living (large city, small city, and rural
area), and number of sons and daughters.
The vector Zi;t includes individual characteristics related
to healthy lifestyle, i.e. a dummy equal to 1 if the
respondent has ever smoked daily, intensity of alcohol
consumption (ranging from non-drinker to everyday drin-
ker), degree of participation in sport activities (never,
sometimes, often), and body mass index category (under-
weight, normal weight, overweight, and obese). We further
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include a full set of regional and wave fixed effects, in
order to capture the impact of any unobserved geographic
and time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the regional
level to allow for autocorrelation of observations located in
the same geographical area.
Moreover, we exploit the longitudinal nature of SHARE
to estimate a fixed-effects specification of (1). Panel
methodologies successfully deal with the endogeneity
arising from the correlation of time-invariant unobserved
covariates and our independent variable, CPI. As a con-
sequence, the use of the fixed-effects estimator provides
further robustness and credibility to our analysis.
Results
Descriptive statistics and preliminary evidence
Our final dataset includes 161,641 observations (defined as
individual-wave pairs), referred to 69,432 individuals, 92%
of which took part in two or more waves. Mean age is
66.5 years, 55% of respondents are female, and the average
years of education are 11. Most of the observations are
either married (69.5%) or widowed (15%) and have, on
average, slightly more than two children. More than half of
respondents are either retired (58%) or employed (26%).
As for lifestyle characteristics, almost 47% of respondents
currently smoke or used to smoke daily, and more than
40% are not engaged with any physical activity. Approx-
imately 60% of individuals are either overweight or obese.
Chronic diseases are quite widespread in our sample, as
more than 60% of the respondents declared to be affected
by at least one. Of all the diseases, cardiovascular diseases
are the most frequent (91.1%), followed by age-related
(14%) and respiratory (9.8%) diseases, cancer (8%), ulcer
(7.4%), and hip or femur fracture (2.9%). See ESM-A for
further details.
Figure 1 provides descriptive evidence of the effect of
CPI on our variables of interest. Even though at a
descriptive level, individuals living in less corrupted
countries (i.e. lower CPI) display on average more diseases
and are more likely to be affected by at least one disease.
Moreover, mean values are significantly different for three
quartiles. In addition, both the number of chronic diseases
and CPI do vary over time and across countries (see ESM-
A). These preliminary findings call for a further econo-
metric investigation that we detail below.
Econometric findings
Pooled OLS results (Table 1, columns 1–4) show that an
increase in CPI is significantly associated with a reduction
in the individual number of chronic diseases, and estimates
are robust to the inclusion of socio-demographic and
healthy lifestyle covariates. The existence of a significantly
negative correlation is confirmed by fixed-effects estimates
(Table 1, columns 5–8). The magnitude of the coefficients
is very similar for the two specifications, providing
robustness to the results. As for the other covariates, the
elders and males are associated with more diseases (ESM-
A), as intuitive for the elders and widely documented in the
medical literature for gender differences [see, among
Fig. 1 Number and probability of chronic diseases for Corruption
Perception Index quartiles. Notes Europe, data from 2004 to 2015.
Average number of chronic diseases (a) and the probability of being
affected by at least one chronic diseases (b) with 95% confidence
intervals, by Corruption Perception Index quartiles. Q1 represents the
highest quartile (the least corrupted countries) and Q4 the lowest
quartile (the most corrupted countries)
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Table 1 The impact of Corruption Perception Index on the number of chronic diseases
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No. of chronic
diseases
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE
CPI - 0.0583** - 0.0582** - 0.0703*** - 0.0696*** - 0.0682*** - 0.0677*** - 0.0696*** - 0.0691***
(0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0261) (0.026) (0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0247) (0.0249)
Age 0.0366*** 0.0269*** 0.0326*** 0.0261*** 0.0219 0.0224 0.0243 0.0247
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0261) (0.0259)
Female - 0.0298* - 0.0546** - 0.0433*** - 0.0514*** – – – –
(0.0168) (0.0212) (0.012) (0.0145)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Healthy lifestyle No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean 1.1789 1.1789 1.1789 1.1789 1.1789 1.1789 1.1789 1.1789
Observations 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641
R-squared 0.105 0.126 0.165 0.175 0.084 0.093 0.11 0.12
Europe, data from 2004 to 2015. OLS ordinary least squares, FE fixed effects, CPI Corruption Perception Index, FE fixed effects. OLS (columns
1–4) and FE (columns 5–8) estimates of specification (1). Region FE include regions in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Wave FE include waves 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 covering the
period 2004–2015. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level in parenthesis
***p\ 0:01; **p\ 0:05; *p\ 0:1
Table 2 The impact of Corruption Perception Index on the probability of suffering from at least a chronic disease
Dependent
variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
At least one
chronic diseases
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE
CPI - 0.0138** - 0.0141** - 0.0179** - 0.0179** - 0.0193*** - 0.0193*** - 0.0198*** - 0.0197***
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0066)
Age 0.0128*** 0.0089*** 0.0120*** 0.0091*** 0.0104 0.0105 0.0112 0.0113
(0.0091) (0.009) (0.0089) (0.0089)
Female - 0.0163*** - 0.0241*** - 0.013*** - 0.0165*** – – – –
(0.0051) (0.0064) (0.0045) (0.0053)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-
demographics
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Healthy lifestyle No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Mean 0.6383 0.6383 0.6383 0.6383 0.6383 0.6383 0.6383 0.6383
Observations 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641
R-squared 0.083 0.098 0.122 0.13 0.072 0.077 0.089 0.093
Europe, data from 2004 to 2015. OLS ordinary least squares; FE fixed effects; CPI Corruption Perception Index; FE fixed effects. OLS (columns
1–4) and FE (columns 5–8) estimates of specification (1), with a dummy if affected by at least one disease as dependent variable. Region FE
include regions in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia,
Spain, and Sweden. Wave FE include waves 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 covering the period 2004–2015. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level in
parenthesis
***p\ 0:01; **p\ 0:05; *p\ 0:1
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others, Nkomo et al. (2006) and Booth et al. (2006)].
Health-related behaviours (i.e. smoking, alcohol con-
sumption, and the Body Mass Index) are also positively
associated with the number of chronic diseases (ESM-A).
Results, in line with the existing literature, support the
claim that individuals in relatively more corrupted coun-
tries display average worse health outcomes. In particular,
a unit increase in CPI is associated with a reduction in the
number of chronic diseases of approximately 0.07. The
magnitude of the estimated coefficients may look relatively
small if we consider that we need a 13-unit increase in CPI
for a unit reduction in the number of chronic diseases. A
plausible explanation lies in the distribution of the number
of chronic diseases in our sample, as almost 70% of
respondents are either not affected by morbidity or suffer
from one only. The average number of chronic diseases,
moreover, is only slightly larger than 1 and does not dis-
play a huge variability in absolute terms.
These considerations need a further investigation on
whether CPI affects the probability that a respondent
reports to suffer from at least one chronic disease in a given
wave. To do so, we replace Healthi;t in (1) with a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the respondent is affected by at least
one chronic disease in wave t and estimate both a pooled
OLS and a fixed-effects linear probability model. Results
are robust to all econometric specifications and show that a
unit increase in CPI is significantly associated with a
reduction in the probability of being affected by at least
one chronic disease by approximately 2% (Table 2). Notice
that linear probability models do not account for any
nonlinearity in the effect of corruption, and it does not
constraint predicted outcomes to be between 0 and 1. To
tackle this issue, we also run logit and probit specifications
(ESM-A). Interestingly, the effect of CPI is still negative
and significant when considering the probability of suf-
fering from a second, a third, and a forth disease (ESM-A).
All these findings corroborate our claim that corruption has
an overall detrimental effect on health outcomes.
As an additional robustness check, we run (1) using CoC
index as a proxy for country-level corruption (see ESM-A
for descriptive statistics on CoC). Results are presented in
Table 3 and confirm our baseline findings. Note that the
two perception indices are highly correlated (0.98) and this
explains the similarity of our results.
Heterogeneity analysis
In what follows, we assess whether corruption has a
heterogeneous effect on health outcomes depending on (1)
factors related to the respondent’s country of residence, (2)
individual socio-demographic characteristics, and (3) type
of morbidity.
Table 3 The impact of Control
of Corruption on the number
and probability of chronic
diseases
Dependent variable No. of chronic diseases At least one chronic diseases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE OLS FE
CoC - 0.139** - 0.18*** - 0.04** - 0.0529***
(0.054) (0.0476) (0.015) (0.0137)
Age 0.0261*** 0.0052 0.091*** 0.0057
(0.0007) (0.024) (0.0003) (0.0081)
Female - 0.0514*** – - 0.0165*** –
(0.0145) (0.0053)
Region FE Yes No Yes No
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Healthy lifestyle Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 1.1789 1.1789 0.6383 0.6383
Observations 161,641 161,641 161,641 161,641
R-squared 0.175 0.13 0.068 0.089
Europe, data from 2004 to 2015. OLS ordinary least squares, FE fixed effects, Coc Control of Corruption
Indexs. OLS (columns 1–3) and FE (columns 2–4) estimates of specification (1), with, respectively, the
number of chronic diseases (columns 1–2) and a dummy if affected by at least one diseases (columns 3–4)
as dependent variables. Region FE include regions in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Wave FE include
waves 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 covering the period 2004–2015. Robust standard errors clustered at regional level in
parenthesis
***p\ 0:01; **p\ 0:05; *p\ 0:1
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Country GDP and health expenditure per capita
The effects of corruption on healthcare outcomes may be
particularly detrimental for individuals living in low-in-
come countries, for a number of interconnected reasons.
First, low-GDP per capita is generally associated with low
public healthcare expenditure, which has been shown to be
correlated with poor health outcomes (Becchetti et al.
2017). At the same time, professionals operating in low-
expenditure healthcare systems generally earn relatively
low salaries, especially when the healthcare system is
financed through general taxation (European Commission
2013). In healthcare systems characterised by compulsory
insurance schemes, however, the most relevant forms of
corruption are billing frauds, excessive medical treatments,
and diversion of funds. Thus, the scarcity of resources
reduces access to healthcare especially for individuals who
are less wealthy, and increases the incentive for healthcare
professionals to ask for informal payments, i.e. bribes, in
exchange for access to healthcare. Thus, the costs of cor-
ruption in terms of chronic diseases would be larger in
countries where individuals are relatively poorer and
healthcare expenditure lower.
To test this hypothesis empirically, we create two
dummies, High_GDPci,t and High_EXPci,t, which equal 1
if respondent i’s country of residence in wave t is above the
median GDP per capita and the median public healthcare
expenditure per capita, respectively. We use data on GDP
from Eurostat and public healthcare expenditures from
OECD. We then split our dataset accordingly (see ESM-B
for the groups of countries) and run the full specification of
(1) separately on each sub-sample.
The effect of CPI on both variables is always negative
but significant only for respondents living in countries with
below-median GDP and public healthcare expenditure per
capita (Table 4). Interestingly, the absolute value of the
estimated coefficients for low-GDP and low-expenditure
countries is almost twice as large as the one estimated for
the whole sample, suggesting that these variables are cru-
cial in determining the effects of corruption on health
outcomes. These findings support our claim that the effect
of corruption on morbidity is heterogeneous and depends
on a country’s wealth and healthcare policies.
The role of individual characteristics
We exploit the detailed information provided by SHARE
and investigate additional channels through which corrup-
tion may heterogeneously affect health. In particular, we
look at how people who differ in gender, age, education,
and income are affected by corruption. These identify key
variables for corruption attitudes as well as standard
characteristics for socio-economic status. Therefore, we
split the sample depending whether respondents were
above or below the median value of each characteristic
considered. Table 4 reports findings from the full specifi-
cation of (1) on each sub-sample.
The effect of CPI remains negative in both sub-samples
but significant only for individuals whose household
income is lower than the country’s median in that specific
wave (Table 4). This result is particularly interesting if we
consider that relatively low-income people are likely to
translate to a reduced healthcare access, especially in
countries where healthcare is not publicly financed. As for
other socio-demographic dimensions, we find that females,
the elders, and low educated people exhibit a stronger and
more stable negative pattern with corruption when com-
pared to their counterparts.
Corruption and categories of chronic disease
We also investigate the effect of CPI on the respondent’s
probability of being affected by a specific category of
chronic disease. This analysis may help us understanding
whether corruption has a heterogeneous effect depending
on the morbidity. While we do not have any ex-ante
hypotheses on the link between corruption and type of
disease, we want to investigate whether it may be
explained by a kind of severity of illness. To investigate
this, we estimate (1) using as a dependent variable a
dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is affected in wave t by
at least one of the diseases included in the categories
defined in ESM-B, i.e. cancer, cardiovascular, age, respi-
ratory, ulcer, and hip or femur fracture.
The effect of CPI is negative for all categories, in line
with our aggregate estimates, and strongly significant for
both cardiovascular diseases and ulcer (Table 5). The
absence of a significant effect on the other diseases may be
justified by their rarity in our sample.
All results are confirmed when we use CoC as a measure
of corruption (see ESM-A).
Perception of corruption in different sectors
To further explore the corruption–health link, we imple-
ment an analysis with sectorial corruption perception.
Eurobarometer data measure respondents’ beliefs about
corruption in the following sectors: public healthcare,
police, judicial courts, national politicians, public tenders,
and the concession of building and business permits. ESM-
A shows results from estimates as in (1) where CPI is
replaced by national average of corruption perception in
each sector. Corruption in healthcare is strongly and pos-
itively associated with the number of chronic diseases. This
strengthens our main results suggesting healthcare as a
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possible channel of the detrimental effect of corruption on
individual health. We find a similar effect in the politics
sector, even though smaller than the one in the healthcare.
Interestingly, among the other sectors coefficients remain
positive but not significant. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that only corruption that may interact with
healthcare sector is detrimental for individual health.
Discussion
The literature on corruption and health has so far focussed
mainly on the effects of corruption in developing countries
on aggregate health outcomes like mortality indicators
(Gupta et al. 2000; Muldoon et al. 2011; Nadpara and
Samanta 2015). Surprisingly, we did not find any contri-
bution assessing these links for high-income countries and
with individual morbidity indicators.
With an analysis on Europeans aged 50?, our findings
show that national corruption is positively associated with
the number of chronic diseases and the probability of being
affected by at least one disease. Estimates are robust to the
inclusion of a wide range of socio-demographic and heal-
thy lifestyle individual factors, as well as the use of alter-
native proxies for corruption.
In line with the literature on developing countries
(Gupta et al. 2000; Nadpara and Samanta 2015), the effect
is mainly concentrated among poorer countries. In other
words, poor European countries and developing countries
do exhibit a similar pattern, while rich European countries
Table 4 The heterogeneous
effect of Corruption Perception
Index
Dependent variable (1) (2) Mean Obs.
Number of chronic diseases OLS FE
Country characteristics
Low p.c. GDP - 0.127*** - 0.071** 1.34 50,209
(0.0282) (0.0267)
High p.c. GDP - 0.0184 - 0.0314 1.108 111,432
(0.0237) (0.0207)
Low expenditure - 0.128*** - 0.0986*** 1.323 56,995
(0.0292) (0.026)
High expenditure - 0.0136 - 0.0259 1.1 104,646
(0.0242) (0.0214)
Individual characteristics
Low HH income - 0.0853*** - 0.098*** 1.32 80,883
(0.0274) (0.0281)
High HH income - 0.0442 - 0.0425* 1.038 80,758
(0.0279) (0.025)
Aged 50–65 - 0.0381* - 0.0366 0.864 81,173
(0.0226) (0.0226)
Aged 66? - 0.0958*** - 0.0923*** 1.497 80,468
(0.0334) (0.0339)
Male - 0.0588* - 0.058** 1.191 72,182
(0.0305) (0.0287)
Female - 0.0777*** - 0.078*** 1.169 89,459
(0.0246) (0.0241)
Low education - 0.0789*** - 0.0562** 1.315 89,638
(0.03) (0.0264)
High education - 0.0836*** - 0.0463 1.009 72,003
(0.026) (0.0293)
Europe, data from 2004 to 2015. p.c. GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product, OLS ordinary least squares,
FE fixed effects, CPI Corruption Perception Index. Pooled OLS (column 1) and FE (column 2) estimates of
specification (1), using the number of diseases as outcome variable. The sample is split, respectively, by
p.c. GDP, p.c. public healthcare expenditure, household income, age, gender, and highest educational
attainment
Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parenthesis
***p\ 0.01; **p\ 0.05; *p\ 0.1
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do not. Also, the effect is more prevalent for cardiovascular
diseases and ulcers. This makes our study particularly
relevant if we consider that cardiovascular diseases repre-
sent one of the main causes of death worldwide (32% in
2015, Wang et al. 2016).
Our study is extremely informative for policy implica-
tions in at least three directions. First, we provide a clear
evidence of the detrimental effect of corruption on health
outcomes, therefore rejecting the hypothesis that corruption
serves as an informal stimulus to increase the quantity of
healthcare services (Leff 1964; Huntington 2006; Méon
and Weill 2010) and reinforcing the fight against corrup-
tion as a possible tool to improve public health (Mackey
et al. 2016). As defined by Acheson (1998), public health is
‘‘the art and science of preventing disease, prolonging life,
and promoting health through the organised efforts of
society’’. Therefore, our study advances the under-re-
searched debate on the link between social behaviour and
population health (Judge et al. 2011). Second, we show that
the health of specific sub-groups such as females and those
with poor socio-economic status is more damaged by
corruption than that of their counterparts. Possible expla-
nations may arise from gender differences in corruption
attitudes (Swamy et al. 2001; Dollar et al. 2001) as well as
the fact that individuals with poor socio-economic status
are less likely to be involved in corruptive practices
because of limited resources. As a result, decreasing cor-
ruption would be possibly entailing not only a decrease in
the population health as a whole but also a reduction in
health inequality. Third, our findings highlight the relation
between highly corrupted countries and cardiovascular
diseases, the leading cause of death in our countries (Wang
et al. 2016). It would be interesting for further research to
understand whether disease-specific relations are explained
by differences in healthcare systems or through the link
with other non-observable factors [for instance, other
clinical factors such as antimicrobial resistance, Collignon
et al. (2018)].
The relation suggests that corruption is detrimental for
health, and this may be explained with a reduction in the
quantity and the quality of healthcare services. However,
our analysis does not explicitly test this channel. We
acknowledge this limitation and we suggest future research
to disentangle the role of healthcare in the corruption–
health nexus, for instance with data on healthcare personnel
wages and services costs. Our analysis does not address
some caveats related with corruption in healthcare either,
such as the type of corruption and the causal nexus between
corruption and health outcomes. As for the type of cor-
ruption, our measure includes all corruption activities,
ranging from grand corruption to petty corruption in the
public sector. With more detailed data, a further analysis
assessing heterogeneity across different types of corruption
would be worth. In particular, future research could help in
explaining whether the link is between overall corruption
and health (for instance, though, individual distress) or
sectorial corruption (and, if so, through less healthcare
quantity and quality and/or differences in public and pri-
vate healthcare). Regarding the causality nexus, we might
think both as corruption deteriorating healthcare quality
and ultimately reducing individual health outcomes, as
well as sick people demanding for more or better health-
care services through corruption practices. With our
results, we do not claim any causality direction, even
though our corruption measures capture also corruption
unrelated with healthcare sector, which is unlikely to be
caused by any diseases. In addition, we find the link
between corruption and health stronger for relatively
poorer individuals, who have more constraints on corrup-
tion practices like bribes (Davis et al. 2004; Corrado et al.
2017). We are also aware of the limitations embedded in
most of the corruption indices, though we strongly believe
that our empirical evidence provides the literature with
very important insights on a relevant topic for high-income
countries.
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